History of Korea

Shortly after coming to power, the regimes of both north and south faced similar challenges. The first challenge was one of attaining legitimacy and the existence of the "other" state was an obstacle in achieving it. Both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made the claim that their respective regime was the sole legitimate government in the peninsula. Thus, the ROK and the DPRK were in competition for the allegiance of the nation. The North under Kim Il Sung and the South led by Syngman Rhee viewed each other as the main barrier impeding national unification. In view of these diametrically opposed positions, it was little surprise to find both leaders soon denouncing each other and calling for a crusade to crush the illegitimate regime on the other side of the 38th parallel, thereby unifying the country under the rightful government.

Not only did the two regimes have to contend with each other, but they also had to deal with a domestic opposition that seriously endangered the consolidation of one-man rule. Thus, the second challenge facing the two regimes came from within. For Syngman Rhee, he had to contend with the politically powerful southern landlords that grew suspicious of Rhee's growing autocratic ways. Rhee also had to confront what was left of the Left in South Korea who began threatening his rule by engaging in armed rebellions and mass demonstrations throughout the country. In facing these challenges, Rhee would use all the autocratic means at his disposal to insure his position at the top. For Kim Il Sung, the domestic challenge to his consolidation of power came from within his own party. As head of the Korean Worker's Party, a union of various communist groupings, Kim was faced with a party that had four different "voices". The first "voice was accented by Russian and headed by Ho Kai-i, the leader of the Soviet faction. Pak Hon Yong led the second "voice" which had a southern Korean accent. The third "voice" had a heavy Chinese accent and was led by Kim Tu Bong, leader of the Yenan faction. The last "voice" was Kim Il Sung's own Kapsin "guerrilla" faction. Fearful of a dangerous cacophony of disunity that would arise with so many "accented voices" singing in disharmony, Kim Il Sung would embark on a campaign to systematically wipe out all the other voices, leaving the party and the state united under the lone voice of Kim Il Sung.

In Korea, the period between 1948 and 1950 was one marked by an intense drive towards political consolidation on the part of the two regimes and its rulers. Additionally, the years between the founding of the two states and the outbreak of war was one of rising friction as both states were strengthening themselves and preparing for, what many believed to be, the inevitable collision between the two rival states and their leaders.

In North Korea, Premier Kim Il Sung took the first steps on the road to socialism. Within a year of the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim was able to nationalize nine-tenths of the nation's industrial production. Also within the year, North Korea, with Soviet assistance and advice, embarked on a two-year economic plan. Following Soviet guidance, the emphasis of the first two year economic plan was placed on heavy industry. The emphasis on heavy industry reflected North Korea's overabundance in factories relative to the ROK and its inadequacy in agriculture compared with that of the south. By 1950, the economic life of the country was now firmly in the hands of the government.

In addition to economic consolidation in the hands of the state, Kim Il Sung strove for political consolidation of his own rule. In June 1949, Kim was well on his was of accomplishing this when he became chairman of the Korean Worker's Party, thereby enabling him to have a tighter grip on both the party and the state. In order to guarantee his continued reign, Kim set out to weaken those within the Korean Worker's Party itself who might be able to challenge his rule. Through careful maneuvering, Kim was able to remove potential challengers from "center stage". Kim started with Pak Hon Yong, erstwhile leader of the South Korean Communists, who fled north after the creation of the ROK. Kim still needed Pak, whose popularity and prestige in the south would be invaluable in any future attempt to unify Korea. Pak was delegated as vice-chairman of the party, a position high enough so that Pak's prestige would bolster Kim's own image in the south, yet contained and enclosed enough so that Kim was able to pull the reins in on Pak if it ever proved necessary. Next, Kim directed his attention to Ho Kai-i. Pulling the political rug from underneath Ho would prove to be more difficult on account of Ho's strong connections to the Soviets. Ho Kai-i was a Soviet-Korean, one of many that returned to Korea after the WW 2; Ho was leader of the "Soviet" faction within the Korean Worker's party. Fearful of angering the Soviets who regarded the Soviet-Koreans in positions of importance as "vehicles" for their continued influence in North Korea, Kim Il Sung had to walk a fine line in dealing with the Soviet faction. By moving slowly, Kim was able to remove most Soviet-Koreans from positions of power, relegating Ho Kai-i as co vice-chairman with Pak Hon Yong. Kim was also cautious in his handling of Kim Tu Bong, leader of the Chinese "Yenan" faction who had strong ties to Mao Tse Tung and the CCP. Kim Il Sung appointed Kim Tu Bong as chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly. As head of the rubber-stamp legislature, Kim Tu Bong was put in a ceremonial office that carried little weight. After the weakening of the various factions within the Korean Workers Party, Kim Il Sung was the lone master of North Korea.

Central to the North Korean regime was the issue of unification. From the onset, the DPRK considered itself as the sole legitimate government in Korea. The North Korean government let it be known, in no uncertain terms, that it was the intention of there government to extend their rule southward to Pusan. To justify their claim as the sole legal government in Korea, the North Koreans pointed to the demonstrations and unrest in the south as proof that the southern regime did not have the support of the populace ( some of the unrest in the south was aided and to some extent planned by the North). Kim Il Sung declared in June 1949 that unification was "the most important and immediate task of the party and the people". At first, Kim turned to the supporting of insurgencies in the south to realize his goal of national unification. However, the inability for insurgencies like the one in Cheju-do to gain momentum convinced Kim that unification could not be achieved by this route. Perhaps by the latter part of 1949, ( By this time, insurgencies which had been a common occurrence in 1948 had begun to subside substantially) Kim had made the fateful decision that he would have to turn to more drastic measures and call on the military to unify the nation. The Korean People's Army, was officially formed in 1948, but it had its true origins four years prior to the official founding when the Soviets began training an indigenous military force ostensibly to maintain peace and order. In 1949, after the defeat of the Guomindang under Chiang Kai Shek, the KPA was augmented by the return of more than 30,000 battle hardened veteran Korean soldiers who had fought alongside the People's Liberation Army. The KPA was further strengthened by the presence of Soviet military advisors among the ranks in addition to the large amounts of military equipment in the form of airplanes, tanks, and artillery. In the end, Kim Il Sung would turn to the KPA to unify Korea.

Syngman Rhee, like his counterpart in the north, also felt the need to consolidate his own power after being elected to the presidency by the National Assembly. Rhee's hunger for the enlargement of executive authority soon ran into conflict with the legislative body that elected him. By expanding the mandate of the National Security Law (NSL), originally designed to crack down on alleged communist inspired sedition {legitimate labor grievances fell into this category} , Rhee used the NSL to suppress any political opposition to his authority, communist or otherwise. Rhee even used the NSL against members of the National Assembly who called for the dismissal of Rhee's cabinet and the purging of former Japanese collaborators in the Rhee bureaucracy, which constituted Rhee's main base of political support. To strengthen support of farmers, while at the same time weakening the influence of Korean landlords {many of whom were Rhee's political enemies within the National Assembly}, Rhee pushed through a land reform bill. Those in the National Assembly who objected to the land reform bill and Rhee's use of Japanese collaborators in his government were subsequently jailed by invoking the NSL. In this way, the National Security Law was used in a variety of ways to eliminate any opposition inside the ROK. Whether political opposition came from the press or from politicians, no one was excluded from being prosecuted for sedition. In the years between the founding of the ROK and the Korean War, Rhee used coercion on every opportunity that presented itself to tighten his authoritarian grip over South Korea.

In addition to political opponents in the press and in the National Assembly, communist inspired insurrections threatened Rhee's bid for political consolidation. The most significant of these was the Cheju-do uprising on October of 1948. Just two months after the founding of the ROK, a rebellion of communist guerrillas and peasants broke out in Cheju Island that challenged the authority of the new regime. The Rhee government's response was a severe crackdown in Cheju-do that resulted in thousands of deaths. In other areas where guerrillas (some with the aid of North Korea) broke out, Rhee succeeded in squashing these internal threats to his power.

Kim Il Sung was not alone in calling for a military solution to unify Korea. Syngman Rhee called for a "march north" to overthrow the communist regime in P'yongyang and to replace it with that of his own. In the years of 1949 and 1950, Rhee stepped up his rhetoric to a feverish pitch, alarming many Americans who feared that Rhee would provoke the North into action. Despite the intensity of his rhetoric, the Republic of Korea was in no war capable of launching a major military campaign to unify the peninsula. The South Korea Army was much inferior to the Korean People's Army in all categories: in experienced soldiers, tanks, artillery, and airplanes. Rhee and his army were much more bark than bite. Although the ROK Army was sufficient to quell domestic rebellions, it was in no condition to fend off a concerted attack from the North, much less launch a major offensive to unify the peninsula.

The Belligerent rhetoric which emanated from both sides created a high level of tension and anxiety along the 38th parallel. The border separating the two Korea was often the scene of violent clashes and routine cross-border raids. Although, clashes along the border would subside in the few months prior to the outbreak of Civil War, tensions remained high between north and south, and so it was merely the calm before the storm.

Liberation and the Korean War