History of Korea

In December of 1945, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Great Britain met in Moscow to construct a trusteeship plan that would solve "the Korean problem" once and for all. The Moscow Conference proposed a four power trusteeship of Korea involving China, Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States that would last for a period of no more than five years. A Joint Soviet-American Commission consisting of the two occupational administrations was created to "make recommendations in consultation with democratic parties and social organizations for the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government." In order to coordinate administrative efforts in preparation for the four-power trusteeship, a joint Soviet-American conference was established.

When word of the Moscow Agreement reached Korea in the latter part December, 1945, it was met by a tempest of protest from all sectors of the Korean community. Massive demonstrations denouncing the four-power trusteeship spread like wildfire throughout Korea. Anxious to quickly realize the dream of Korean independence, the vast majority of Koreans were unable to accept the idea of foreign power trusteeship. A non partisan "Committee for Total National Mobilization Against Trusteeship" was created to voice opposition to the Moscow Agreement; it had support from the extreme right, the communists and everyone else in between. In the eyes of most Koreans, the trusteeship proposal were viewed as a mechanism to establish a permanent great-power protectorate of Korea. Anything short of immediate Korean independence was deemed as unacceptable to most Koreans.

The communists headed by Kim Il Sung in the North and Pak Hong Yong in the South, who had initially supported the anti-trusteeship campaign, suddenly shifted their support in favor of the Moscow Agreement under heavy Soviet pressure. Cho Man Shik, the leading non-communist nationalist in the North, who had initially lent support to Kim Il Sung, denounced the communist about-face. Cho was quickly arrested and subsequently disappeared into oblivion. The communist flip-flop in the south led to a serious loss of support among the populace there. The decision on the part of the Korean communists of both north and south posed a difficult barrier to continued national unity which hinged on the cooperation between rightist and leftists groups.The disagreement between the extreme-left and the right over trusteeship had the effect of polarizing politics in Korea almost to the breaking point. In an attempt to ward off the negative effects of the communist defection, the remaining elements of the anti-trusteeship coalition formed a "People's Assembly" to resist the implementation of the trusteeship plan. The "People's Assembly" had only limited success in restoring national unity; the big gaping hole left by the communist defection proved too large to patch up.

As the political debate between Koreans who favored the multi-power trusteeship plan and those that opposed the plan came to a head, the U.S-Soviet Joint Commission met in March of 1946 to discuss the implementation of the Moscow Agreement. The Soviet delegation took the position that only those Korean parties who approved of the Moscow Agreement should meet with the Joint Commission. It was clear that this Soviet proposal would exclude all the political groups within Korea who had objected to the trusteeship plan, namely everyone except the communists. The Soviet proposal if accepted would lead to an interim Korean government headed solely by communists. Not surprisingly, the American delegation rejected the Soviet proposal on grounds that acceptance of the proposal would be a violation of democratic principles. The Americans insisted that the Joint Commission consult both those approving of the trusteeship plan and those opposed to it. On May, 1946, the Joint Commission acknowledged the impasse and adjourned.

As the Joint Commission talks stalled, political developments in Korea took a turn for the worse. The political debate became even more divisive as both the right and left mobilized to break the deadlock. Syngman Rhee rallied his supporters in the Democratic Party to form the "National Council for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence. Rhee sought to establish an autonomous Korean government, disregarding the Joint Commission and any plans for trusteeship altogether. He called for Koreans to ignore the trusteeship proposal made at Yalta and Moscow and to create an interim government on their own. Meanwhile, supporters of Kim Ku, head of the Korean Independence Party and Rhee's rival for rightist support, forged a "National Assembly made up of former members of the Korean Provisional Government. The main theme that the "National Assembly" espoused centered around resistance to trusteeship; on this point Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee were in accord. But they differed on one crucial point; Syngman Rhee opposed collaboration with the "reds", whereas Kim Ku urged cooperation between the two sides, for the good of the country. Above all else, Ku feared a divided peninsula and the creation of two separate regimes. To ward off political division of the nation, Ku made friendly overtures to the left in an attempt to bridge the gap over an increasingly growing political chasm that threatened to the split the country in half.

Another attempt to resolve political differences and construct a coalition body that would unite all Korean patriots for the sake of the nation was led by Kim Kyu Sik and Yo Un'hyong. Yo Un'hyong, leader of the moderate-left who headed the now defunct Korean People's Republic, and Kim who commanded the moderate-right, sought through their own cooperation to "promote a unity of action" between the right and the left. Initially, this moderate grouping received the tacit support of the USMGIK. Later, this American support of moderates would be replaced by overt support of Syngman Rhee and his backers.

At the same time that the right and the moderates were organizing, the leftists were also busy at work. Led and dominated by the communists, the Democratic National Front was created to coordinate a pro-trusteeship campaign. Kim IL Sung used this opportunity to weaken the non-communist that were opposed to the idea of trusteeship. With the expulsion of non-leftists from positions of power and influence in the Soviet occupied zone, Kim Il sung endeavored to strengthen his own position within the communist camp using his close ties with the Soviets and his reputation as a patriotic guerrilla fighter to gain prominence in the North.

The Joint Commission resurrected itself in May of 1947 to once again try to resolve the standstill. An air of deja-vu was present at the talks as the Soviets clinged onto their previous proposal to exclude all political parties who were hostile to trusteeship from consultation with the Joint Commission. Soviet intransigence was matched by American determination to allow all political groups to participate in the decision making process. Fearing a communist dominated interim government if they were to concede to the Soviets, the American delegation was adamant and would not budge. In July, the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission was dead and buried, never to rise again.

Of all the contributing factors that lead to the collapse and failure of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, two factors deserve special attention. Firstly, developments at the global level were largely responsible for the breakdown of the Joint Commission in particular and U.S.-Soviet cooperation as a whole. By 1947, the U.S.-Soviet alliance that had been forged because of a common and convenient enemy, Nazi Germany, was gone. With the Nazi threat now removed, the main reason for a Soviet-American alliance disappeared. By 1945, Soviet and Western armed forces race to "liberate" and occupy parts of Asia and Europe before the other could seize it. As suspicions of each other's intentions and actions grew, the Cold War was born. By 1947, the pace of the Cold War had quickened as U.S. Containment Policy began to unfold and Soviet fears of encirclement mounted. In this type of atmosphere of suspicion, cooperation between the superpowers now in Korea was unlikely. As the rival superpowers now perceived their relationship in zero sum terms, a gain for one became a loss for the other, each was extremely reluctant to give an "inch" if it meant losing one's position vis a vis the other. In other words, Korea was a "strategic and ideological football" and the 38th parallel was the line of scrimmage and both the Soviet and American teams refused to put the ball in play for fear of fumbling and turning the "football" over to the other side.

Secondly, the ever-increasing political polarization within Korea hampered the prospects for a positive outcome of the Joint Commission deliberations. The political cleavage between the left who favored the Moscow Agreement' trusteeship proposals and the right who denounced it mirrored the Soviet-American discord, doing nothing to relieve the tension but in fact adding to it. Adding fuel to the fire, the development o pseudo-governmental bodies in the North and its counterpart in the South, with the encouragement of their respective superpower sponsors, made the idea of a single, unified even more out of reach.

Liberation and the Korean War